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such resources but then attribute the effects they discuss to the
rational allocation of mechanisms to higher priority tasks.
I turn now to the main substance of the target article. The
authors argue that, by adding a mechanism that rationally allocates
processors (occupiable resources) to tasks, they can render their
processor account superior to the depletable-resources account.
Their argument is convincing. However, it is not fair or balanced.
They have shown that an occupiable-resource account that
incorporates a rational allocation mechanism is superior to a
depletable-resources account that does not incorporate such a
mechanism. It is perfectly possible to rationally allocate depletable
resources – electricity suppliers do it when faced with a large
unexpected loss of generating capacity. A mechanism precisely
analogous to the one that the authors describe could be added
to the depletable-resources account.
If this were done, it is unlikely that the resulting model would
be inferior to the one proposed by Kurzban et al. There is no
reason to suppose that prioritization of resources using opportu-
nity costs would be any less effective than prioritization of pro-
cessors using opportunity costs in explaining all the phenomena
that the authors discuss. For example, effects of incentives and
availability of alternative tasks, such as using a smartphone,
could be handled equally well. Furthermore, one could still
argue, as the authors do, that “the sensation of ‘mental effort’ is
the output of mechanisms designed to measure the opportunity
cost of engaging in the current mental task” (sect. 2.3.2, para. 2,
italics original).
It might prove difficult to design experiments to distinguish the
occupiable-resources account and the depletable-resources
account of performance decrements if a rational resource allo-
cation mechanism were added to both types of model. Recovery
rates after demanding performance may provide one line of attack.
Unfortunately, there is a third possibility. Both processors and
depletable resources may be rationally allocated to tasks. Dis-
tinguishing this alternative from the other two is likely to pose
further difficulties.
Finally, I consider the authors’ argument that there are no pro-
posals that identify an explicit neural resource beyond Gaillot and
Baumeister’s (2007) argument in favour of glucose. Kurzban et al.
say that any such proposals would need to explain: “(1) what the
resource is, (2) how that resource is depleted by effortful tasks,
(3) how depletion of the resource is sensed and leads to sub-
sequent decrements in task performance, and (4) why some
kinds of mental/neural activity, but not others, lead to resource
depletion” (sect. 4.1, para. 6).
These seem very stringent conditions for classifying something
as a depletable neural resource. There are many neurological pro-
blems, such as Parkinsonism, where performance decrements can
be attributed to some neural resource (e.g., a neurotransmitter or
neurohormone) that cannot be renewed at the rate at which it is
depleted. In such cases, the resource has been primarily depleted
not by an effortful task but by disease. Effective drug treatments
replace the resource. In cases such as this, the depletable resource
is not fuelling the processor but acting as a means of signalling for
it. However, its depletion still causes performance impairment.
Kurzban et al. appear to exclude depletable resources that serve
as signals rather than as fuels from their definition of a depletable
resource. For example, though they say they know of no proposals
for an explicit neural resource beyond glucose, they still suggest
that information about opportunity costs needed for rational allo-
cation may be provided by levels of a neurotransmitter, such as
dopamine. This looks like a depletable-resource account: It pre-
dicts that chronic depletion of dopamine via disease or experimen-
tal manipulation will lead to an inability to regulate its levels in the
prefrontal cortex for signalling purposes, and that, as a result,
rational allocation would be impaired.
Distinguishing occupiable and depletable resources at the
neural level is open to the criticism that all brain constituents
are subject to chemical turnover. Ultimately, it is the rate of this
turnover that should allow us to distinguish resource types.
Occasionally, I need to replace parts of my car when they are
broken or worn out. This does not mean that my car is a depletable
rather than an occupiable resource: I have to replace parts of my
car much less frequently than I have to re-fill it with fuel.
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Abstract: Different to Kurzban et al., we conceptualize the experience of
mental effort as the subjective costs of goal pursuit (i.e., the amount of
invested resources relative to the amount of available resources). Rather
than being an output of computations that compare costs and benefits of
the target and competing goals, effort enters these computations as an input.
Kurzban et al. argue that mental effort experienced during task
engagement is a function of opportunity costs – that is, the
degree to which the mental processes allocated to a target task
or goal are not available for other tasks or goals. We consider
this idea intriguing and concur that feelings of effort, like other
sensations, are most likely the outputs of mechanisms designed
to produce inputs to decision-making systems (Bloom 2010;
Thornhill 1998). We doubt, however, an additional assumption
of the model, namely, that the experience of effort itself
changes as a function of the presence of competing goals. We
propose a potential alternative account of subjective feelings of
effort and their adaptive value. Accordingly, subjective effort
emerges from cost computations associated exclusively with the
currently pursued goal and is a function of the means invested
into the goal at hand and the means available for pursuing it. In
our conceptualization, alternative goals do not enter this compu-
tation through opportunity costs. The presence of competing
goals may, however, draw more attention to the resources and,
in turn, the effort invested into pursuing the target goal.
Our account of mental effort differs from Kurzban et al.’s
account regarding the effect of competing outcomes. Kurzban
et al. predict that competing goals increase mental effort
through opportunity costs, that is, the degree to which resources
invested into the target goal are not available for achieving com-
peting goals. In our view, subjective effort is a function of the
resources a person perceives to invest into the pursuit of the
target goal in relation to the subjectively available goal-relevant
resources (e.g., when time is crucial for pursuing the target
goal, perceived effort is mainly based on how much of one’s avail-
able time is spent for its pursuit). Based on the definition of goals
as cognitive representations linking means to desired outcomes
(e.g., Freund et al. 2012; Kruglanski et al. 2002), the subjective
perception of effort should be related to the means of goal
pursuit (i.e., how many resources does one have to invest to
attain the outcome?). Kurzban et al. posit that mental effort is
related to potential outcomes or alternative goals, but it remains
unclear how people gauge the effort if they do not do so on the
basis of how many resources they invest relative to the resources
they have available for the pursuit of a target goal. By reflecting
these relative costs, subjective feelings of effort provide an infor-
mational basis for further cost-benefit computations that deter-
mine whether an individual decides to continue investments
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into the goal at hand or turn away from it and towards other goals.
As costs during task engagement accumulate over time, the
feeling of mental effort during task engagement increases
simultaneously (cf. Boksem & Tops 2008). In agreement with
Kurzban et al., and contra to previous accounts of mental effort
(Kahneman 1973), we consider mental effort not a finite capacity
but a metacognitive phenomenon that signals the ratio of the finite
amount of available resources to the subjectively invested ones.
How, then, is the subjective experience of effort influenced by
potential alternative goals? We posit that perceiving alternative
desired outcomes draws attention to the means of goal pursuit
to determine whether such outcomes require the same means.
The presence of competing outcomes should make people
become more aware that their resources are finite and have to
be spent carefully, that is, that they are best invested in means
that yield the most valuable outcome (e.g., Ebner et al. 2006).
Each alternative goal has an (expected) cost/benefit ratio. In
order to compare multiple goals, a person needs to make a rough
overall estimate as to how many resources will be needed and are
available to attain the goals. Hence, a person should compare the
experienced cost/benefit ratio of the ongoing goal against the
expected cost/benefit ratio of additional or alternative goals. In
this way, the mental effort invested into goal A enters cost-
benefit computations that compare target goal A to the alternative
goal B (note that goal B might also be to pause the pursuit of a
target goal in order to conserve resources; Boksem & Tops 2008;
Hennecke & Freund, in press). The presence of alternative goals
creates a reference against which the cost/benefit ratio of the
ongoing goal-pursuit is compared. By triggering this comparison,
alternative goals draw attention to the effort – as a subjective rep-
resentation of the costs – invested into the ongoing goal. Without
changing subjective effort directly, alternative goals might thus
change the perception of effort by putting it into the center of atten-
tion (Kool et al. 2010). By providing information about the means/
resources a person currently invests into the pursuit of a goal, sub-
jective effort allows a rough estimate of how many resources are
available for the pursuit of additional or alternative goals. It may
thereby serve as an important metacognitive cue as to whether to
continue with the current goal or to switch to an alternative goal.
This function would be undermined if subjective effort were
affected by the presence of alternative goals. Note that this concep-
tualization of subjective effort does not imply that it is a veridical
reflection of the actual costs and resources a goal requires. A
person might very well underestimate goal requirements and/or
available resources, which might then lead to such phenomena as
the planning fallacy (Buehler et al. 1994).
Important in the current context, however, is that our concep-
tualization of subjective effort should be unaffected by the pres-
ence of competing outcomes. Rather than being an output of
computations that consider (potential) costs and benefits of the
current and the competing goal, effort enters these computations
as a subjective representation of the costs of the current goal. As
proposed by Kurzban et al., experiments that assess and compare
perceived mental effort under different concurrent task con-
ditions are needed to compare both accounts.
Persisting through subjective effort: A key role
for the anterior cingulate cortex?
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Abstract: One shortcoming of Kurzban et al.’s model is that it is not clear
how animals persist through subjectively effortful tasks, particularly over a
long time course. We suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex plays a
critical role by encoding the utility of an action, and signalling where
efforts should be best directed based on previous and prospected
experience.
Kurzban et al.’s model aligns well with emergingmetacognitive pro-
posals of fatigue and effort, and provides a useful account of why
task switching occurs. However, under many circumstances individ-
uals continue to persist in a primary task where the immediate costs
are considerable and where alternative options present significant
benefits. As an example, in academia the tangible rewards of
funding, publication, and tenure are far removed from the
months of executive-function–demanding writing, research, and
teaching required to reach these goals. The level of persistence
needed in such scenarios is not well accounted for in the proposed
model, which predicts that the large opportunity costs associated
with long-term goals should prompt a high mental-effort signal
and subsequent re-prioritization of behavior. So how do we some-
times “stay the course” in the face of subjective effort?
Several potential mechanisms could be involved in persistence.
While the fatigue signal could be directly attenuated, say, by
reward receipt, other mechanisms could operate upstream of
this point. For example, the discounting of the primary goal that
normally occurs under conditions of temporal distance, uncer-
tainty, or exertion, could be attenuated during the cost/benefit
evaluation. Alternatively, the degree of discounting of competing
tasks could be increased. Kurzban et al. suggest that the key to
task persistence involves attenuating the effort signal through
reward, although they are not specific about the underlying
brain mechanisms. Here we propose that activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) is critical, functioning to integrate cost/
benefit ratios to provide a relative utility signal that may work
directly to suppress subjective effort.
As the target article notes, as ACC activity decreases, so does
task performance. One interpretation of this effect is that as
long as activity in this region of the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
remains high, vigilance and persistence are maintained. We and
others have examined single-unit ACC activity during decision
tasks and found that heightened firing appears to indicate a worth-
while course of action; however, a sufficiently strong signal may be
required to drive pursuit and persistence (Amiez et al. 2005;
Hillman & Bilkey 2010; Quilodran et al. 2008; Sallet et al. 2007;
Shidara & Richmond 2002). Importantly, this ACC signal
appears only when significant cost/benefit analysis is required; fur-
thermore, heightened firing does not always correspond to the
most costly action, but rather seems to indicate the most worth-
while choice in terms of relative cost/benefit computed utility
(Hillman & Bilkey 2010; Kennerley et al. 2006; Rudebeck et al.
2008). Moreover, the ACC is recruited regardless of the actual
type of effort involved – be it physical exertion, competitive fight-
ing, or mental taxation – suggesting that the region may be
responding to generalized opportunity cost calculations inherent
in cost/benefit decision tasks.
These encoding characteristics of ACC match the descriptions
of several of the opportunity cost model components illustrated in
Figure 1 of the target article: The ACC’s experience-based encod-
ing of cost/benefit computations provides an output signal that
drives allocation of cognitive processes towards completion of
tasks with optimal utility. Viewing the ACC in this way – as a
dynamic utility encoder versus a cost encoder – represents a
minor but important shift in thinking, one that could account
for the persistence signal missing from the current model.
Strong ACC signals could drive task persistence; however, as
the ACC output signal wavers (“utility decreasing”), the phenom-
enology of effort begins, leading to reductions in persistence.
Hence, the subjective experience of effort is, we propose,
neither the result of the initial ACC recruitment nor the result
of low levels of ACC activity, but rather, it results from a decre-
ment in ACC activity from some prior, higher level. When tasks
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